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Airports and airlines have been increasingly establishing vertical contracts, which have 
a wide variety of forms. These contracts have important implications for policy issues, 
namely for regulation and price discrimination legislation. In this paper we develop a 
model to analyse the effects of three types of vertical contracts, in what regards welfare, 
pro-competitiveness and the scope for regulation. We find that two types of contracts 
are anti-competitive, and that in all of them consumers are better-off, though in one of 
them  within  conditions  regarding  operational  efficiency.  We  also  conclude  that 
regulation may (or may not) improve welfare depending on the type of contract and that 
price capping has different effects according to the facility the price of which is capped.   
Moreover,  we  find  that  these  agreement’s  effects  exhibit  a  trade-off  between  pro-
competitiveness and welfare and between price discrimination and welfare.  
 
JEL code: R48, L93 
Keywords: vertical contracts, regulation, airports, airlines. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When one airline has an important market share in an airport, both partners may be 
interested in establishing agreements concerning the use of the airport’s facilities, which 
includes the fees and charges airlines pay. These agreements create a situation of price 
discrimination that favours the airlines that sign them, while those that stay out of the 
agreement pay higher fees and charges. On the other hand, vertical contracts may lead 
airlines to acquire market power in the upstream (airport) market, whenever they allow 
airlines  to  operate,  for  example,  terminals,  and  so  control  the  downstream  market 
through the access to the input. Price discrimination and control, even if partial, of the 
input market, may be anti-competitive. But vertical contracts and collusions may also 
benefit consumers and be welfare-enhancing, as they may eliminate the so-called double 
marginalisation.  Thus  vertical  contracts’  effects  often  exhibit  a  trade-off  between 
competitiveness and welfare. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse this trade-off, by examining three main types of 
vertical contracts between airports and airlines, and to find out which types of contracts 
and of clauses lead to results that make consumers better (worse)-off and which ones are 
pro (anti) competitive. Furthermore, this paper analyses the effects of airports regulation 
under vertical contracts. In fact, the issue of de-regulation is currently on the agenda of 
national authorities concerned with air transport and competition
1, it is also important to 
analyse how vertical agreements may change the scope for regulation. Indeed, vertical 
contracts  lead  to  deep  changes  in  the  upstream  market,  where  the  airport  sells  its 
facilities to airlines, but these effects spill over downstream markets, where airlines sell 
flights  to  passengers.  Such changes may  lead politicians  to  question  issues like  the 
effects of regulation under these contracts, what prices should be regulated and what 
effects should be expected.   
 
Using a model that considers the downstream and the upstream markets and so allows 
for a two-stage game, we analyse the effects of three types of vertical contracts in what 
regards three main issues: (i) welfare and consumer surplus, (ii) pro-competitiveness, or 
the effects on other airlines that remain as outsiders and (ii) the effects of regulation.   
                                                
1 The United Kingdom has been a pioneer in these issues. See, for example, the Competition Commission 
(2008) and the Civil Aviation Authority (2008) documents.   3 
 
Vertical  agreements  between  an  airport  and  one  or  more  airlines  are  common.  In 
Europe,  they  have  not  been  disclosed,  as  they  involve  clauses  that  may  go  against 
articles 81 and 82 of the European Union Treaty, and so the European Commission has 
investigated  and  condemned  some  of  these  agreements
2.  In  the  United  States  (US) 
agreements between airports  and the so-called “signatory airlines” are common and 
frequently fully disclosed. In Australia, these agreements can also be found in major 
airports, like in Sydney and in Melbourne. In Section 3 we take a closer look at the 
existing vertical contracts and at the clauses they involve. 
 
As we show in Section 3, there is a wide variety of vertical contracts between airports 
and airlines, so that it is convenient, for our purposes, to establish a typology. Starkie 
(2008) considers three main types of agreements: (i) the European case (which we call 
the first case), where contracts are relatively new and focus on negotiated charges for 
the  use  of  the  airport  facilities;  (ii)  the  Australian  case,  (our  second  case)  where 
agreements lie in long term leases on terminals; and (iii) the US case (our third case), 
with “majority in interest clauses” for signatory airlines.  
 
We use Starkie (2008)’s three types of vertical contracts to develop three models for 
vertical restraints. Results differ much according to the type of contract and depend on 
the  clauses  (restraints)  they  include.  Thus,  in  the  first  case,  contracts  are  anti-
competitive but welfare-enhancing. However, price regulation restores competitiveness 
and increases consumer surplus, even when allowing for the contract to persist. In the 
second case, vertical restraints are anti-competitive but may increase welfare, depending 
on  airlines’ efficiency  in terminal  operations.  Price cap regulation may  only restore 
competitiveness if is applied to the price airlines charge for leased terminals but not if it 
regulates airports’ charges. In the third case vertical contracts are pro-competitive and 
also increase welfare, though only concession revenues may support the agreements. 
Additionally, in this case regulation is only useful if there are few airlines in the market. 
If markets are competitive enough, price cap regulation makes consumers worse-off. 
                                                
2 Examples are the cases of the Zaventem/Brussels National Airport in favour of the national flag carrier 
Sabena, of the Finnish airports of Helsinki, Vaasa, Turku, Pori and Tampere for a discount of 60% on 
landing fares on domestic flights of domestic airlines, of the Portuguese Airport Authority, ANA, which 
offered discounts of 50% on charges for domestic flights of domestic airlines and of Brussels Charleroi 
airport, which offered lower charges to Ryanair.   4 
 
Vertical relations have scarcely been dealt with in air transport studies (Oum and Fu, 
2008). According to the same authors, the effects of vertical agreements are two-sided, 
and need further investigation. In this sense, this paper adds to literature as it is intended 
to fill this gap. Formal models on this issue were seldom developed, and conclusions on 
the sign of effects were never made clear. Mostly, and as far as we are aware, the effects 
of  these  vertical  restraints  on  competitiveness and  on  welfare  were  never  analysed. 
Vertical collusion between airports and airlines was analysed elsewhere (Barbot, 2008), 
considering the effects of a vertical merger (collusion) in the competition between two 
airports and between the airlines that use it. In this work, the role and the effects of 
other airlines (outsiders) were not assessed, as it is developed under the hypothesis that 
only one airline operates in each airport. The present paper does not focus on the issue 
of airport competition but rather of airline competition in a single airport and of market 
foreclosure
3 in the event of a vertical agreement. The issue is of great importance within 
the context of air transport policy. In fact, it is unclear if these arrangements are pro-
competitive  and  welfare-enhancing,  and  it  seems  that  policy  makers  hesitate  when 
facing cases of vertical agreements as well as on regulation practices in presence of 
these contracts. As an example, Oum and Fu (2008) refer that the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has shown concern towards exclusive deals between airports and 
airlines.  
 
Also, the paper adds to general literature of vertical merger as it considers two types of 
agreements that are common in air transport but were not analysed neither for other 
industries nor within a theoretical framework.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on the 
effects  of  vertical  restraints.  Section  3  specifies  some  forms  of  vertical  contracts. 
Section  4  develops  the  models  and  results.  Finally,  in  Section  5  some  concluding 
remarks are presented. 
 
2. The effects of vertical restraints: Literature 
 
                                                
3 We use foreclosure as the use of market power by one firm in one market to restrict output in another 
market, but excluding rival from this last market.   5 
We  shall  first  relate  to  vertical  contracts  in  Air  Transport  literature.  Starkie  (2008) 
analyses the reasons and possible effects of vertical agreements between airports and 
airlines. Following this author, in Europe contracts are novel and result of air transport 
liberalisation. Before liberalisation, flag airlines were public entities that operated in 
public airports where they had a dominant position. There was no need of contracts as 
the vertical relation was between two public entities. With liberalisation these entities 
were often privatised, new airlines (in particular, low cost carriers) entered the market 
and many airlines started operating routes that were former preserved territories. Thus, 
air transport markets became more competitive but also more risky, which lead to the 
need of establishing vertical contracts. However, vertical contracts have a long duration 
and airlines will bear sunk costs, which will reduce their mobility in switching to other 
airports and so also airport competition will hampered. (Starkie, 2008). Thus vertical 
contracts  are  a  novelty  and  tend  to  increase  in  number,  which  stresses  the  need  to 
analyse their effects.   
 
Oum and Fu (2008) suggest that both airports and airlines have incentives for vertical 
agreements, the former by being able to exclusively supply a dominant airline and so 
increase their market share towards other competing airports, and the latter by securing 
its  operational  needs  as  well  as  by  getting  competitive  benefits  over  other  airlines. 
Barbot (2008) shows that, however, that these benefits do not always exist and that they 
may be reaped out if other competing airports and airlines also engage in agreements. 
 
Basso  and  Zhang  (2007)  focus  on  congestion  delays  with  airport  rivalry.  In  these 
authors’  model  there  are  two  competing  airports.  A  multistage  game  is  used  to 
determine capacities and fares, using congestion costs. Results regard the comparison 
between a monopoly and a duopoly facility, and a central planner one, in prices and 
congestion delays.  
 
Basso  (2008)  analyses, as  an  extension,  the case  of  two-part  tariffs  imposed  by  an 
airport,  which,  according  to  the  author,  leads  to  the  same  solution  of  joint  profit 
maximisation by airports and airlines. With a two-part tariff the airport charges a price 
per  flight  plus  a  fixed  fee.  Though  airlines  behave  as  horizontal  colluders,  the 
maximisation of joint profits allows the airport to capture part of the airlines’ extra 
profits by means of the fixed fee. Basso (2008)’s paper differs substantially from the   6 
present one. In fact, this author considers an agreement with all airlines while I consider 
a contract with one (or more) airlines, but always leaving other airlines remain outside 
the agreement. This difference is important because, as will be shown in the paper, the 
existence of outsiders does not allow the airport to capture airlines’ profits, but rather, it 
creates market power both in the downstream and upstream markets for one airline. Put 
in  other  words,  in  Basso  (2008)’s  paper  there  are  no  outsiders  in  the  joint  profit 
maximisation and pro-competitive effects cannot be examined, but only welfare effects. 
Besides, this author uses a Cournot setting in the downstream market, while I develop 
my paper with the Stackelberg model, though this does not make much difference to 
results, as will be shown below. 
 
In what regards general Industrial Organisation literature on vertical relations, Tirole 
and Rey (2006) provide a wide survey on vertical restraints and merger. This literature 
is extensive and so we limit its review to the analysis of situations that are similar to our 
cases, in what regards the issues we focus, namely, the effects on market foreclosure 
and on welfare. 
 
The debate on the effects of vertical restrictions on market foreclosure inside Industrial 
Organisation literature is also extensive. Ordover et al. (1990) provide a review of the 
critics addressed to the foreclosure result. These critics advocate that the excluded firms 
may have incentives to stay in the market. However, those incentives are based on the 
existence of other suppliers, which is not the case of this paper. Part of the criticism 
relies  on  the  possibility  of  outsiders engaging  in  vertical  contracts  with  other  input 
suppliers, or simply buying the input from them at “market” prices. Another part claims 
that the upstream firm may not be interested in foreclosing the downstream market as it 
may lose buyers.  
 
Ordover et al. (1990) give an example which is worth referring here: if the integrated 
downstream firm has a share of 10% the input supplier would lose 90% of the market. 
Our objection is that, in the case we are analysing, there is an airline with a larger 
market share. Airports would never establish contracts with airlines that are marginal in 
terms of market share. That is one of the reasons why we have chosen the Stackelberg 
model in the downstream market as it fits better real situations. In fact, the European 
cases mentioned in the Introduction of this paper involve contracts of airports and flag   7 
(dominant) airlines. In the Charleroi case, Ryanair agreed “to base between two and 
four aircrafts at Charleroi and to operate at least three rotations per aircraft leaving 
Charleroi over a 15-year period” (European Commission, 2004). This means that, if the 
contracting airline was not a leader of the airport’s market share, the agreement planned 
that it would be. In fact, in 2002, the first year of the agreement, 94% of passengers 
departing from Charleroi were carried by Ryanair (European Commission, 2004). To 
engage in an agreement, it is necessary that one airline has a large market share. If it 
were not so, the validity of the criticism is a matter of time. If the airline is able to 
quickly fill the market (in the case, the slots) left by the foreclosed rivals, the argument 
is no longer valid. The same objection applies to a criticism referring to the fact that 
foreclosed rivals might well participate in the bidding for a contract with the upstream 
firm. Even if they were willing to, the airport would not probably be interested with in 
agreements with airlines that are marginal in terms of market share. 
 
Effects of vertical mergers on consumer surplus have long been recognised as positive 
(Comanor, 1967). A merger of two successive monopolies increases consumer surplus, 
which was often expressed by the idea that successive monopolies are worse than a 
single  monopoly.  By  eliminating  double  marginalisation  vertical  merger  allows  for 
lower  downstream  (consumer)  prices.  Outside  the  context  of  two  vertically-related 
monopolies, there is a long literature considering two oligopolies or one oligopoly and 
competition, either in the upstream or in the downstream markets, and using Cournot or 
Bertrand competition. Results on welfare differ according to the models’ hypotheses. 
But none of these works deals with the simple case of an upstream monopolist and 
downstream imperfect competition and homogeneous goods
4 which is depicted in this 
paper.  
 
3. Types of agreements between airlines and airports 
 
Literature on vertical merger shows that results depend crucially on the number of firms 
in each market and on the type of contract. In order to support the models developed in 
the next section and to set the limits within which their results are valid, it is necessary 
to review the types of agreements that airports and airlines are (or were) engaged in.  
                                                
4 Comanor and Frech (1985) use an upstream monopolist but with two types of consumers, thus 
introducing product differentiation.    8 
Contracts between airports and airlines have several forms, and clauses vary from case 
to case.  
 
In Europe, these agreements have only been disclosed whenever they were investigated 
by  the  European  Commission  or  by  national  authorities  but  they  clearly  aim  at 
negotiating aeronautical fares. The Charleroi-Ryanair agreement is a good example of 
these contracts. The agreement involved a discount of 50% in landing charges (over the 
price charged to other airlines),  and a discounted price for ground handling, by means 
of which Ryanair payed only about 10% of the price set for other companies (European 
Commission,  2004).  In  the  Belgium,  Finnish  and  Portuguese  airports  contracts,  as 
referred  above,  the  core  of  agreements  was  a  discounted  fare  for  flag  airlines  in 
domestic flights. This type of agreements is the base of our first case. Other types of 
agreements in Europe are not numerous. In Munich Airport, Terminal 2 is operated by a 
company  that  belongs  to  the  airport  and  to  Lufthansa  and  used exclusively  by  this 
airline and its partners. In Copenhagen airport, a discounted rate is offered to airlines 
that surpass a certain threshold of passenger numbers. 
 
In the US, it is quite usual that some airlines (the so-called signatory airlines) sign 
contracts with airports. In general, these contracts establish that signatory airlines pay a 
lower price for the use of the airport’s facilities, terminals and runways, (frequently, a 
price that approaches the operating cost), and a rent that intends to pay part of the 
airport investment. Such is the case of Atlanta International Airport Agreement
5. We 
use the Atlanta agreement as the base for our third case. 
 
Other clauses are sometimes added. The “Airline and Tampa Airport Use and Lease 
Agreement”  establishes  that  signatory  airlines  pay  fees  and  charges  based  on  the 
airport’s costs of providing facilities. They include not only the payment of investments, 
                                                
5 “Under the Airport Use Agreements, the Signatory Airlines agree to pay landing fees to allow the City 
to recover certain operating and maintenance expenses as well as debt service plus 20% coverage on 
General Revenue Bonds issued to finance approved airfield capital improvements. The City has also 
entered into agreements that extend to 2010 with the principal passenger airlines serving Hartsfield-
Jackson (the “Contracting Airlines”) relating to their use and lease of the central passenger terminal 
complex (the “CPTC Leases”). The CPTC Leases provide for the calculation of terminal rentals and 
charges to allow the City to recover certain operating and maintenance expenses as well as debt service 
plus 20% coverage on General Revenue Bonds issued to finance approved terminal projects” (City of 
Atlanta Department of Aviation, 2007.   9 
by  means  of  specific  rebates  of  debt  service  coverage  but  also  sharing  of  the  net 
remaining revenue. A similar agreement exists in Orlando International Airport.  
 
In Dallas Fort Worth signatory airlines have a Use Agreement with the Airport Board. It 
is residual in the sense that all airport’s revenues that exceed the airport’s total costs 
(debt  service,  coverage,  operation  and  maintenance  costs)  are  returned  to  signatory 
Airlines. The Use Agreement allows signatory airlines to sublet their space to other 
airlines, whenever the former lease terminal space on an exclusive basis, as well as to be 
handled in it by signatory airlines. This contract approaches our second case. 
  
Other  airports,  like  Chicago  O’Hare,  have  individual  contracts  with  each  signatory 




4. The model 
 
4.1. General framework 
 
The basic model assumes quantity leadership in the downstream market, where airlines 
sell tickets for flights to passengers, and, in the upstream market, where the airport sells 
its facilities (terminals, runways) to airlines, a situation of a single seller and a few 
buyers.   
 
The application of Stackelberg quantity leadership to the downstream market seems 
more realistic. Table 1 shows a high concentration of airlines’ flights in the100 largest 
airports in the world, for 2005, with a mean for the first carrier’s share of 38%, and of 
56% for the two largest carriers. Most of these high shares belong to flag carriers, in 
Europe and Asia, or to carriers that established their bases at particular airports in the 
US. These airlines may be considered as quantity leaders because, as first comers, they 
chose their quantities (as well as the best timetables) and left the remaining slots for 
other carriers. Thus it seems that the Stackelberg behaviour is more appropriate than the 
Cournot model to assess the effects of vertical contracts. Table 2 exhibits the same 
                                                
6 But terms of these agreements are not disclosed and were not known to the author.   10 
concentration in some European secondary airports in 2004, where the dominance of 
low cost carriers is clear. 
 
Insert Table 1 
Insert Table 2 
 
The downstream market consists of a route operated by n+1 airlines, one leader and n 
followers.  I  assume  that  flights  are  identical,  with  neither  horizontal  nor  vertical 
differentiation. Demand for flights has a simple expression, p = a-bq, where p is the 
price and q the quantity. For simplicity, it is assumed that the only cost airlines bear is 
the airport aeronautical fare, P, per passenger, while the airport has a constant marginal 
operational cost, c, per passenger, and a fixed cost, F.  
 
The game is played in two stages. In the first stage the airport chooses the aeronautical 
fare, P, and in the second stage airlines choose their quantities.  
 
4.2. Basic model with no agreement 
 
In  the  basic  model,  in  the  second  stage  airlines  compete  in  quantities  in  the  usual 
Stackelberg fashion. Each one of the followers (or airline i) maximises its profits, ￿i = 
(p (qi+(n-1)qj+qD) -P)qi, where qD is the quantity of the leader and qj is the quantity of 
any of the other followers. As costs are identical, qj = qi, and the best reply functions 
(BRFs) will depend only on qD. Using the followers’ BRFs the leader maximises its 
profit, ￿D = ( p(qD+nqi(qD))-P)qD and find its quantity, qD (P) while the followers will 
determine their quantity, qi (P), depending on the leader’s.  
 
In the first stage the airport maximises its profits, ￿A=(P(qD+nqi(qD))-c)(nqi(qD)+qD)-F, 
with its  derived demand function, q(P)  = qD  (P) +  qi  (P), finding solutions for all 
variables. Results are in Appendix 1. 
 
4.3. First case: vertical merger 
 
In this case the leader airline and the airport negotiate the fare, P1 that the leader will 
pay for using the airport facilities. The other n airlines will pay a fare P, as before, with   11 
P>P1. The negotiation aims at both partners obtaining the highest joint profits so that 
the solution for this case is the same of a vertical merger.  
 
This merged firm maximises,  in both markets (in qD and P), its joint profits, ￿C = 
(p(qD+nqi(qD))-c)qD+(P-c)nqi  (qD)  -F,  using  the  followers’  BRFs.  Results  for  all 
variables are in Appendix 1. 
 
The price P1 will be obtained by negotiation, depending on the bargaining power of 
each partner, but this price is not relevant for our analysis. 
 
 
Proposition 1: An agreement between one airport and the leader carrier established to 
negotiate a lower fare for the airline: (a) is anti-competitive, as the other airlines are 
driven out of the market; (b) if the demand function in the downstream market is linear, 
it increases welfare and consumers’ surplus. 
 
Proof:  
(a)The merger foreclosures the dowstream market by making P=p. If making P<p were 
a profit maximising solution for the merger, it would face competition and have ￿C = 
(p(q*D+nqi(q*D))-c)q*D+(P-c)nqi (q*D) –F. With p=P, it will be a monopoly in the 
downstream  market  and  have  a  maximum  profit  of  ￿F  =  (pF(q*F)-c)q*F–F.  It  is 
necessary to show that: ￿F > ￿C. Let ￿M = (pM(q*M)-P)q*M–F be a monopolist’s profit in 
the downstream market with unitary cost P. Then, ￿M +(P-c)nqi (q*D) is always higher 
than ￿C. If ￿F > ￿M +(P-c)nqi (q*D), ￿F >￿C. This happens if (pF(q*F)-c)q*F> pM(q*M)qM 
-PqM+Pnq*i  –cnq*i+cqM-cqM  =  (pM(q*M)-c)qM  +(P-c)(nq*i  –  q*M).  But,  as  (nq*i  – 
q*M)<0,  if  (pF(q*F)-c)q*F>(  pM(q*M)–c  q*M,  the  above  inequality  holds.  Note  that 
(pM(q*M)-c)q*M is the profit of a monopolist in the downstream market with cost c (or 
the profit of the merger). But if it is so, the monopolist will never have chosen q*M 
because qF originates the highest profit in this case. So, the inequality pF(q*F)-c)q*F 
>(p(q*D+nqi(q*D))-c)q*D+(P-c)nqi (q*D)is true and means that the merged firm prefers 
to make P=p, and so make the outsiders’ profits equal to zero and become a monopolist 
in the downstream market. The agreement is anti competitive.  
   12 
(b) If demand in the downstream market is linear, the sum of the n airlines’ BRFs will 
have the form: qi=A -BqD, with B<1. Then the whole quantity, q, is q= A+(1-B)qD, an 
increasing function of qD. But qD is higher (and so does q) when qi=0 than when qi>0. 
Then the merger provides a higher quantity than the pre-merger situation. The higher 
quantity leads to a lower price and a to a higher consumer surplus. 
 
The profit of a downstream monopolist with marginal cost P is higher than the sum of 
all firms’ profits in the pre merger situation. Besides, the sum of this monopolist’s and 
the initial airport’s profits is lower than the merger’s profit (a monopolist with marginal 
cost c), so that the sum of all profits and thus welfare will be higher with the merger. 
 
Joint  profit  maximisation,  by  eliminating  double  marginalisation,  offsets  the 
downstream monopoly effect and consumer surplus and welfare will be higher.  
 
Re-doing  the  model  with  a  Cournot  game  in  the  downstream  market,  the  airport 
colluding with one of them leads to the same result. So there is no need of quantity 
leader.  Stackelberg  model  was  used  as  it  seems  to  depict  better  real  situations.  A 
contract between the airport and two or more airlines would also not change results, 
provided that there were some outsiders left out of the agreement. In this situation the 
merged airlines would act as colluders in the downstream market.  
 
Corollary 1: If a regulator sets a price PR, p>P>PR>c, in the upstream market, (a) the 
leader  and  the  airport  may,  under  certain  conditions,  be  interested  in  signing  the 
agreement (b) with the agreement, the outsiders will remain in the market and (c) if 
demand in the downstream market is linear regulation increases consumers surplus.  
 
Proof: 
(a) The leader and the airport may agree in negotiating a lower price, PN (PN< PR). The 
merger profit would be ￿F = (p(q*F+nqi(q*F))-c)q*F+(PR-c)nqi (q*F) –F. The merger is 
now a Stackelberg leader with cost c. A lower cost yields a larger quantity and a higher 
profit margin. The outsiders’ quantity qi increases as the followers’ cost (PR) is smaller, 
but also decreases because the leader’s quantity is higher. The difference between the 
merger’s profit will be higher than the sum of profits of the leader and the airport under 
regulation  if  (p(q*F+nqi(q*F))-c)q*F+(PR-c)nqi  (q*F)>(p(q*D+nqi(q*D))-c)q*D+(PR-  13 
c)(nqi (q*D)+ q*D)). If the gains in the downstream market outweigh the losses in the 
upstream market, which depends on price elasticities, the agreement will be interesting 
for both partners. 
 
(b) Now the merged firm cannot set P=p. With any price PR, p>P>PR>c, the outsiders 
will make profits and remain in the market.  
 
(c) Then regulation is pro-competitive but does not eliminate incentives for contracts of 
this type. However, and it can be easily computed from the expressions in Appendix 1, 
downstream quantities increase for any PR<P. Then, downstream prices fall, and so 
consumer surplus is higher. 
 
This  case  corresponds  to  the  situations  referred  above  of  European  airports 
discriminating prices amongst airlines (Finish and Portuguese airports, or the Charleroi 
agreement). Our conclusions show that, if there are no capacity constraints
7, there is no 
reason to condemn these agreements if aeronautical fares are regulated. If they are not, 
the  regulator  will  face  the  trade-off  between  an  increase  in  welfare  and  a  loss  in 
competitiveness. 
 
4.4. Second case: Airlines in the upstream market 
 
Starkie (2008) describes the Australian case as one in which one or more airlines lease 
and operate terminals. The same is true for the agreement in Dallas Forth Worth. All 
airlines that remain outside this agreement use the terminal facilities provided by those 
(the signatory airlines) that explore them. Part of the upstream market services are now 
supplied by one airline. 
 
In order to model this situattion we divide the airports’ facilities in two items: terminals, 
with  a  constant  marginal  cost  of  t,  and  runways,  with  constant  marginal  cost  of  r. 
Suppose  then  that  the  dominant  airline  now  fully  operates  the  terminal,  using  its 
facilities and selling them to other airlines at a price P1, while the airport operates the 
                                                
7 Constraints on capacity might limit the outsiders’ quantity.   14 
runway for all airlines at a price P2. Previous to the agreement c=t+r, but afterwards the 
airline may have a higher (or lower) efficiency in the terminal operation. 
 
The dominant airline’s profits will be ￿D = (p(qD+nqi(qD))-t-P2)qD +(P1-t)nqi (qD), and 
each of the followers’ profits will be ￿i = (p (qi+(n-1)qj+qD) –P1-P2)qi. As in the basic 
model,  outsiders  have  a  BRF,  derived  from  their  profit  maximisation.  The  leader 
maximises  its  profit  using  the  followers’  BRFs,  and  from  there  results  the  derived 
demand for the airport’s facilities, now with two firms exploring them. In the upstream 
market the leader and the airport compete in prices P1 and P2 for complementary goods 
(the terminal and the runway). The airports’ profits are now originated only by the 
revenues of the runway facilities: ￿A = (P2(qD+nqi(qD))-r)(qD+nqi(qD)-F. Solutions for 
the upstream prices yield solutions for all other variables and are presented in Appendix 
1. 
 
Proposition 2: With a linear demand function in the downstream market, a contract 
between the leader airline and the airport, stating that the airline operates and sells 
part  of the airports’ facilities, (a)  is anti-competitive and  (b) decreases  consumers’ 
surplus and welfare, unless the leader airline is able to increase the efficiency in the 
facilities it operates. 
 
Proof:  
The proof uses the expressions of Appendix 1. 





=  and qi=0. Then 
n=0. In the first stage (upstream market), the best solution for the leader and for the 
airport is to set P1 = p-P2, resulting zero profits for the followers, which are driven out 
of the market. 
 
With this contract the leader can, by itself, foreclosure the market by setting P1 = p-P2. 
In the first stage, the leader and the airport compete in the upstream market, with BRFs 
P1(P2)  and  P2(P1)  that  are  negatively  sloped,  as  goods  (terminal  and  runway)  are 
complements. Setting a higher P1 will lead to a lower P2, which causes a fall in the 
leader’s costs.  Moreover,  if P1= p-P2, the leader will have monopoly profits in the 
downstream market. The two benefits outweigh the losses derived from not selling the   15 
terminal facilities to the other airlines, under the assumptions of Proposition 2 (linear 
demands). If demands are not linear, the result depends on the balance between gains 
from  being  a  monopolist  and  gains  from  selling  the  terminal  facilities,  or  on 
downstream and upstream demand elasticities. 
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If  c=t+r,  this  inequality  holds  for  any  n>0
8.  Then,  if  there  are  no  efficiency 
improvements,  consumers’  surplus  decreases.  It  can  only  be  higher  if  the  leader 
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. This ratio depends  positively on  n,  which means that the more 
airlines in the market before the agreement, the higher should the ratio be, or the more 
should  the  leader  increase  terminal  operations  efficiency  in  order  to  improve 
consumers’ surplus.  
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It also happens that this inequality holds for any n>0, or that, when c=t+r, welfare is 
lower after the agreement. 
 
Proposition 2 provides interesting policy insights, as it shows that this type of contracts 
should  only  be  allowed  under  the  condition  of  airlines  improving  the  efficiency  of 
terminal operations.  
 
 
Corollary 2: If the leader airline does not improve efficiency in the airport facilities it 
operates,  an  agreement  set  under  the  conditions  of  Proposition  2,  may  only  be 
interesting  for  both  partners  if  the  leader  airline  pays  a  rent  to  the  airport  that 
                                                
8 Notice that n is the number of followers in the market before the agreement.   16 




The airport loses profits with the contract, as it now only sells part of its facilities. 
Suppose that c=t+r, and make k=a-c=a-(t+r). The rent, R, should be higher than the 
airport’s losses: 




k R . 
On the other hand, the rent should be lower than the leader’s gains with the agreement: 




k R . 
It is possible that such a value of R exists for any n>0. Then, there are incentives for the 
agreement provided that the negotiated rent lies between those two limits. 
 
 
Corollary  3: In  the  case of an agreement in  the  conditions of  Proposition 2, if the 
regulator price caps P1 all airlines will stay in the market but if only P2 is regulated 
then  regulation  cannot  prevent  the  agreement  from  being  anti-competitive  and  the 
monopoly in the downstream market will persist.  
 
Proof: 
Let P1* and P2* be the upstream market prices under the agreement. If the regulator sets 
any price cap for the terminal facilities, P1
R, t<P1
R<P1*, the leader cannot by itself be a 
monopoly in the downstream market, by eliminating its competitors. This result can 
only be achieved if the airport would set P2 such that P2=p-P1
R. In the upstream market, 
the airport’s BRF is P2(P1), and is negatively sloped. As P1 falls with regulation, the 
airport increases P2. The airport may push up P2 up to the limit P2=p-P1
R, which would 
eliminate the followers, or keep it below that value. The first alternative leads to a 
monopoly in the downstream market, a smaller number of passengers and less market 
power  for  the  airport.  The  second  alternative  keeps  competition  in  the  downstream 
market, with more demand and more market power for the airport. The airport would 
never give up demand and accept a downstream monopoly that would lead to a fall in 
P2. It will prefer to set P2<p-P1
R.    17 
 
If P2 is regulated, it must be set below the initial price, P2
R<P2
*. In the upstream market 
the leader alone determines P1. As its BRF is negatively sloped, it may charge a higher 
P1 and eliminate the followers in the downstream market. As shown in Proposition 2, 
the leader prefers this solution. 
 
Then, the regulation of airports where these types of agreements exist should focus on 
the price of the facilities that one (or more) airline operates, and not on those under the 
operation of the airport. 
 
3.5. Third case: price discrimination 
 
This case depicts many of the agreements between an airport and the so-called signatory 
airlines  in  the  US,  which  are  established  in  a  way  that  airlines  pay  the  airport  the 
variable costs of its facilities plus a part of the fixed costs. As shown in Section 3 they 
sometimes contain a clause that allows the airlines a share in the airports’ revenues. In 
our model, we shall disregard this clause and so assume that the dominant airline pays 
exactly the cost c for using the airport facilities, as well a part, k, of the airport’s annual 
fixed costs, in the total amount of kF, which is agreed between the two partners. The 
other airlines pay a price, P, for the use of the airport’s facilities. 
 
Let qD
C be the leader’s quantity after the agreement. The dominant airline’s profits are 
now: ￿D = (p(qD
C+nqi(qD
C))-c)qD
C –kF, and the airport’s profits: ￿A = (P(nqi(qD
C))-





Proposition 3: An agreement between an airport and an airline, by which the airline 
pays the cost of using the airport’s facilities plus a fixed rent, does not foreclosure the 
downstream market. Moreover, if the demand function in the downstream market is 
linear consumer surplus and welfare will be higher with the agreement. 
 
Proof:  
The  leader  cannot  control  the  downstream  market  as  all  the  airport’s  facilities  are 
directly sold to the outsiders by the airport, which determines P. From the expression of 
the airport’s profits, ￿A = (P(nqi(qD))-c)nqi-(1-k)F, it is clear that it will never make   18 
P=p, or it would lose all revenues, except kF, which only covers part of the fixed costs 
and is not relevant for the determination of P. 
 
Using the expressions of Appendix 1 it is easy to show that the difference in consumer 














+ + . This expression is 
always positive. This difference increases with n, meaning that the higher the number of 
airlines in the downstream market, the more consumers benefit with the agreement. A 
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+ + + + , which is always positive.  
 
Then,  under  the  conditions  of  Proposition  3,  this  kind  of  agreement  is  not  anti-
competitive  and  leads  to  a  higher  welfare.  However,  these  contracts  are  price 
discriminatory as the signatory airlines pay only the cost of the facilities while the other 
airlines pay a full price P that includes a profit margin. As Rey and Tirole (2006) point 
out, anti-discrimination legislation may have a perverse effect of decreasing welfare by 
restoring the monopoly power of the input supplier.  
 
If the demand in the downstream market is not linear, it is true that qD will always be 
higher, as the leader’s costs are now lower (c<P). This rise will cause a fall in qi. But 
the airport’s demand is smaller now, as the leader is out of this market, and P will fall, 
which will cause a rise in qi. The final result in qi and in the total quantity will depend 
on the outsiders’ best reply function, and on price elasticity in the upstream market, 
which  depends  on  the  downstream  demand  function.  If  the  total  quantity  rises, 
consumer surplus will increase.  
 
Now we analyse the conditions of the agreement. It is easy to see that the leader’s 
profits are higher as its costs are lower after the agreement. As for the airport, it loses 
part of its revenues (those from the leader’s use of its facilities), has a smaller demand 
and charges a lower price. So, the rent airlines pay to the airport, kF, must, at least, 
compensate it for its losses.  








C –( p(qD+nqi(qD))-P)qD 
Corollary 4: With a linear demand function in the downstream market, there is not a 




The rent should have an upper limit equal to the leader’s gains with the agreement and a 
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From the expressions in Appendix 1 it is easy to show that the extra profits the leader 
earns with the agreement are smaller than the profits the airport loses for any n>0.618. 
Then there is no value of kF that matches the above conditions, or, put in other words, 
that makes the agreement interesting for both partners. Thus, or it is a public airport and 
is not interested in profits, but only in attracting more traffic, or it can pay the losses 
with concession revenues
9. These revenues not only increase the airport’s profits but 
also have effects on all the model’s variables. Namely, they induce the airport to lower 
aeronautical charges in order to get more passengers, and consequently induce airlines 
to lower their fares.    
 
Corollary 5: If, under the agreement, a regulator sets a price cap PR<P*, where P* is 
the  equilibrium  price  with  the  agreement,  and  if  the  downstream  market  demand 
function is linear, regulation will only lead to a higher consumer surplus if there is a 
single airline behaving as follower in the downstream market.  
 
Proof:  
The price cap not only affects the equilibrium quantities of the airport and of the airlines 
that  remain  outside  the  agreement  (non-signatory  airlines),  but  also  the  leader’s 
                                                
9 Re-doing the model with concession revenues, and even in the simplest option (considering that each 
passenger spends a fixed amount in concession activities) yields too complex results to be analysed.   20 
quantity, through the followers’ BRFs. Suppose P* is the upstream equilibrium price for 
the airport’s (runway) facilities, with the agreement and before regulation. The regulator 
sets a price PR, c<PR<P*. With a smaller input price, qi will be higher, as the followers 
have a lower cost, but, as qD is lower, with linear demand functions in the downstream 
market,  the  whole  quantity,  q,  is  smaller  for  n>1.  In  fact,  and  as  can  be  seen  in 
Appendix 1, the difference between the two quantities (after and before regulation) is 











- - ,  which  is  negative  for  any  n>1.4.  For  any  n>=2, 
downstream quantities will be lower, and prices higher, leading to a lower consumers’ 
surplus. Consumers will only be better-off if there is a single follower, or in the case of 
a duopoly.  
 
With more than one follower there is no point for regulation. Moreover, the agreement 
is pro-competitive, but regulation only changes the relative quantities of the airlines, by 
increasing qi and decreasing qD. If the market is competitive enough (or if it has more 
than one follower), the agreement is more efficient without regulation. 
 
5. Concluding remarks: Some policy issues 
 
This paper is intended to answer to questions that are currently of great importance for 
designing  appropriate  policies  for  the  air  transport  industry,  namely  how  vertical 
relations between airports and airlines affect competition and welfare, what is the scope 
for price discrimination legislation, and how regulation performs when there are vertical 
restraints. 
 
According  to  findings  of  Industrial  Organisation  literature,  pro-competitiveness  and 
welfare  effects depend on market structures and on  the  clauses  included in vertical 
contracts. We concluded that price negotiation (or vertical merger) and the operation of 
terminals or other airport facilities by airlines are anti-competitive.  
 
The first case typically exhibits the trade-off between competitiveness and welfare (as 
the merger increases consumers’ surplus and welfare), leaving politicians a decision on 
allowing or not agreements, which means making (or not making) passengers or other 
airlines (with implications on other variables, like employment) better-off. However,   21 
regulation may balance the trade-off, by leaving consumers better-off and by giving 
room for the merger but not for market foreclosure. Additionally, and as the agreement 
improves consumers’ surplus but price discriminates amongst airlines, politics should 
review the scope for price discrimination legislation.  
 
The second form of vertical contract only increases consumers’ surplus and welfare if 
there are enough improvements in terminal operations by the airlines. The lesson that 
can be learnt (though within the restrictive model framework of this paper) is that these 
arrangements  should  be  allowed  under  the  condition  of  airlines  achieving  a  higher 
efficiency in terminals operations. Welfare-enhancing regulation should focus on this 
point, and pro-competitiveness regulation should focus on capping the price signatory 
airlines charge to others, but not the price the airport charges all airlines. 
  
The third form of contract is pro-competitive and increases welfare. So, it seems that 
there is nothing wrong with these contracts. The only problem that there is no incentives 
for  airports  signing them, except  if they are public and have other aims than mere 
profits, or if they can compensate losses with higher expenses in concession activities’ 
goods and services. Moreover, it seems that regulation cannot add much, unless the 
market has few firms. This third form of vertical contract is also price discriminating, 
which adds another reason for questioning the point for not allowing this practice. 
 
Finally, we should point out that anti-competitive results may not happen in a way that 
all airlines kept outside agreements are driven out of the market. Additional market 
imperfections, like slots’ grandfathering rights hold by these airlines, or the leader’s 
lack of capacity to supply the whole demand in the downstream market may prevent 
this  result.  Thus  results  should  be  understood  as  a  tendency,  or  an  increase  in  the 
contracting airline’s share, which does not withdraw the validity of the outcomes for 
policy purposes. 
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1. Basic model 
 
Downstream demand function: p = a-bq. 
CS = Consumers’ surplus 
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